3707. As I explained in Rosenberger, “[r]esolution instead depends on the hard task of judging—sifting through the details and determining whether the challenged program offends the Establishment Clause. 2d 660, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4485 — Brought to you by Free Law Project, a non-profit dedicated to creating high quality open legal information. The Court first squarely faced the issue in Everson. (ii)  Respondents’ second argument—that provision to religious schools of aid that is divertible to religious use is always impermissible—is also inconsistent with the Court’s more recent cases, particularly Zobrest, supra, at18–23, and Witters and is also unworkable. Justice Souter also relies on testimony by one religious school principal indicating that a computer lent to her school under Chapter 2 was connected through a network to non-Chapter 2 computers. (a)  In modifying the Lemon test—which asked whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, see 403 U. S., at 612–613—Agostini examined only the first and second of those factors, see 521 U. S., at 222–223, recasting the entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s effect, id., at 232–233. 17–21. Moreover, the answer to the indoctrination question will resolve the question whether an educational aid program “subsidizes” religion. See, e.g., Witters, supra, at 486–487; see also Rosenberger, supra, at 848 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Witters). Thus, although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly hold that Meek and Wolman were no longer good law, its reasoning seemed to require that conclusion. Of course, our focus on the lack of such evidence would have been entirely unnecessary if we had believed that the Establishment Clause permits the actual diversion of secular government aid to religious indoctrination. Relying on Witters and Zobrest, we noted that our cases had taken a more forgiving view of neutral government programs that make aid available generally without regard to the religious or nonreligious character of the recipient school. The most directly pertinent doctrinal statements here are these: no government “can pass laws which aid one religion [or] all religions … . Respondents’ contentions that Agostini should be limited to its facts, and that a presumption of religious inculcation for instructional materials and equipment should be retained, must be rejected. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’   ” 330 U. S., at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1879)). For to say that a program does not create an incentive to choose religious schools is to say that the private choice is truly “independent,” Witters, 474 U. S., at 487. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. The materials could only be used in teaching secular, neutral, and non-ideological programs. §7372(c)(1). A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected”). Indeed, Agostini expressly rejected respondents’ absolute line. Accordingly, while the Court was willing to apply an irrebuttable presumption that secular instructional materials and equipment would be diverted to use for religious indoctrination, it required evidence that religious schools were diverting secular textbooks to religious instruction. App. The Court’s decisions demonstrate its repeated attempts to isolate considerations relevant in classifying particular benefits as between those that do not discernibly support or threaten support of a school’s religious mission, and those that cross or threaten to cross the line into support for religion. 18 The coordinator of the Jefferson Parish LEA ordered the books recalled sometime in the summer or early fall of 1985, and it appears that the schools had complied with the recall order by the second week of December 1985. 14–22. With respect to the specific Title I program at issue, we noted several factors that precluded us from finding an impermissible financing of religious indoctrination: the aid was “provided to students at whatever school they choose to attend,” the services were “by law supplemental to the regular curricula” of the benefited schools, “[n]o Title I funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools,” and there was no evidence of Title I instructors having “attempted to inculcate religion in students.” Id., at 226–228. Pp. The plurality would break with the law. The majority misapplies it. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S., at 226. Of these 46, 34 were Roman Catholic; 7 were otherwise religiously affiliated; and 5 were not religiously affiliated. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), we rested our approval of the relevant programs in part on the fact that the aid had not been used to advance the religious missions of the recipient schools. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985), both of which had involved such a program. See, e.g., Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), the Court adopted the redefinition of neutrality as evenhandedness, citing Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 782, n. 38, and alluding to our discussion of equal access in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). Id., at 783, n. 38 (citations omitted). 14–17. Until today, this Court has never permitted aid to go directly to schools on a school-wide basis. In the 1986–1987 fiscal year, for example, 44% of the money budgeted for private schools in Jefferson Parish was spent by LEA’s for acquiring library and media materials, and 48% for instructional equipment. First, compelling an individual to support religion violates the fundamental principle of freedom of conscience. The risk of diversion is obviously high when aid in the form of government funds makes its way into the coffers of religious organizations, and so from the start we have understood the Constitution to bar outright money grants of aid to religion.11 See Everson, 330 U. S., at 16 (“[The State] cannot consistently with the ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church”); id., at 18 (“The State contributes no money to the schools. Finally, the statute provides that all Chapter 2 materials and equipment must be “secular, neutral, and nonideological.” §7372(a)(1). Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, see 403 U. S., at 612–613, in Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors, see 521 U. S., at 222–223. Sch. (ii) Respondents’ second argument–that provision to religious schools of aid that is divertible to religious use is always impermissible–is also inconsistent with the Court’s more recent cases, particularly Zobrest, supra, at 18—23, and Witters and is also unworkable. 260a–261a; see also id., at 120a. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 848 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining Witters as reconciling principle of neutrality with principle against public funding of religious messages by relying on principle of private choice). Respondents neither question the Chapter 2 program’s secular purpose nor contend that it creates an excessive entanglement. The statute explicitly requires that such aid be “secular, neutral, and nonideological,” and the record indicates that the Louisiana SEA and the Jefferson Parish LEA have faithfully enforced this requirement insofar as relevant to this case. It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government.” School Dist. As to the second, monitoring by SEA and LEA officials is highly unlikely to prevent or catch diversion.15 As to the third, compliance with the labeling requirement is haphazard, see App. 330 U. S., at 18. See supra, at 10. Long after Regan we have continued to find the supplement/supplant distinction, like the bar to substantial aid, to be an important consideration. 26–33. On the other, we have recognized that the religious element in the education offered in most sectarian primary and secondary schools is far more intertwined with the secular than in university teaching, where the natural and academic skepticism of most older students may separate the two, see Tilton, supra, at 686–689; Roemer, 426 U. S., at 750. That presumption is especially appropriate in this case, since there is no proof that religious school officials have breached their schools’ assurances or failed to tell government officials the truth. From that new view of the law, and from a majority’s mistaken application of the old, I respectfully dissent. Taking the second inquiry first, it is clear that Chapter 2 does not define aid recipients by reference to religion. To resolve the dilemma, the Fifth Circuit abandoned any effort to find coherence in our case law or to divine the future course of our decisions and instead focused on our particular holdings. The Court has no choice but to hold that the program as applied violated the Establishment Clause.28. Because this is a more complex inquiry under our case law, it is useful first to review briefly the basis for our decision in Agostini that New York City’s Title I program did not result in governmental indoctrination. For example, in Meek we explained: “[I]t would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions from the predominantly religious role performed by many of Pennsylvania’s church-related elementary and secondary schools and to then characterize [the statute] as channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian. The statute generally requires that an LEA ensure the “equitable participation” of children enrolled in private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, §7372(a)(1), and specifically mandates that all LEA expenditures on behalf of children enrolled in private schools “be equal (consistent with the number of children to be served) to expenditures for programs . As already mentioned, the Court first referred to neutrality in Everson, simply stating that government is required “to be a neutral” among religions and between religion and nonreligion. In Agostini, however, we brought some clarity to our case law, by overruling two anomalous precedents (one in whole, the other in part) and by consolidating some of our previously disparate considerations under a revised test. Ruling in early 1997 on postjudgment motions, he reversed the decision of former Chief Judge Heebe and upheld Chapter 2, pointing to several significant changes in the legal landscape over the previous seven years. The Ninth Circuit also relied, id., at 1467, on our observation in Board of Ed. 527 U. S. 1002 (1999). 125a (deposition of president of sectarian high school) (“Our teachers, whether they are religion teachers or not, are certainly instructed that when issues come up in the classroom that have a religious, moral, or value concept, that their answers be consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church and that they respond in that way to the students, so that there can be opportunities in other classes other than religion where discussion of religio[n] could take place, yes, sir”); id., at 73a, 74a. Respondents neither question the Chapter 2 program’s secular purpose nor contend that it creates an excessive entanglement. See supra, at 10–11. The evidence of violations of Chapter 2’s supplantation and secular-content restrictions is equally insignificant and, therefore, should be treated the same. If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. Today, the substantive principle of no aid to religious mission remains the governing understanding of the Establishment Clause as applied to public benefits inuring to religious schools. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concluded that Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, controls the constitutional inquiry presented here, and requires reversal of the Fifth Circuit’s judgment that the Chapter 2 program is unconstitutional as applied in Jefferson Parish. In what follows I will flesh out this summary, for this case comes at a time when our judgment requires perspective on how the Establishment Clause has come to be understood and applied. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. For example, in Agostini, neutrality was only one of several factors we considered in determining that New York City’s Title I program did not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Everson, supra, at 8–11 (relating colonists’ understanding of recent history of religious persecution in countries with established religion); Engel, supra, at 429 (discussing struggle among religions for government approval); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 623 (1971). of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 399–400 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), distinguished. 205a, 210a, 206a–207a; see also id., at 108a (statement of second-grade teacher indicating that she used audiovisual materials in all classes). See, e.g., Agostini, supra, at 228, 231–232; Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dept. That omission, however, is of little comfort. App. See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U. S., at 254 (invalidating aid for transportation on teacher-accompanied field trips because an “unacceptable risk of fostering of religion” was “an inevitable byproduct”); Meek, 421 U. S., at 372 (striking down program because of a “potential for impermissible fostering of religion”); Levitt, 413 U. S., at 480 (invalidating aid for tests designed by religious teachers because of “the substantial risk that … examinations, prepared by teachers under the authority of religious institutions, will be drafted with an eye, unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church”); Lemon, 403 U. S., at 619 (finding invalid aid with a “potential for impermissible fostering of religion”); cf. (b) Under Agostini, the Court asks whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion and whether the aid has the “effect” of doing so. Id., at 140a. Twelve years earlier, in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985), we had held the same New York City program unconstitutional. First, we explained that the Court had since abandoned “the presumption erected in Meek and Ball that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion.” Id., at 223. “A:  No. The aid formula does not—and could not—indicate to a reasonable observer that the inculcation of religion is endorsed only by the individuals attending the religious school, who each affirmatively choose to direct the secular government aid to the school and its religious mission. Id., at 95a–96a. Finally, the same criteria can be reviewed to determine whether a program constitutes endorsement of religion. 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